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CONTROLLING PRECEDENT:
CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
Gary Lawson*
Modern federal courts scholars have been fascinated by the
question of Congress' power to control the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.' This fascination is not difficult to explain: the
question is theoretically profound and raises fundamental issues
about the roles of Congress and the federal courts in the constitutional order.2 As a practical matter, however, the question has
proven to be of limited significance. Despite a recent spate of
legislation restricting access to courts by prisoners and immigrants,3 people talk about wholesale jurisdiction-stripping far
more than they actually do it.
By contrast, Congress routinely regulates the manner in
which federal courts exercise their jurisdiction. A host of federal
statutes seek to guide, and even control, the process of decisionmaking that federal courts employ to decide cases within their
jurisdiction. This crucial aspect of congressional power, however, has been largely neglected by federal courts scholars -and
by the courts themselves, who have quietly acquiesced in wideranging congressional efforts to control the judicial decisionmaking process.4 Given the relative importance of questions
* Professor of Law, Boston University. I am grateful to Akhil Amar, John Harrison, Mike Paulsen, and Larry Yackle for their generous advice on this article; it is a reflection on me rather than on them that I failed to follow much of it. Much of the
groundwork for this article was laid while I was a Professor at Northwestern University
School of Law, and I am indebted to that institution for its support.
1. A list of major works on the topic since 1984 recently filled a page-long footnote. See David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial
Branch, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 75,76 n.2.
2. The President, of course, is a player in this matter as well: any federal statute
concerning the jurisdiction of the federal courts must survive the presentment process.
See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3.
3. For a thoughtful series of articles describing and evaluating these statutes, see
Symposium: Congress and the Courts: Jurisdiction and Remedies, 86 Georgetown. L.J.
2445-2636 (1998).
4. See, for example, Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (broadly upholding Con-
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concerning control of jurisdiction and control of decisionmaking, the widespread neglect of the latter is noteworthy.
There are signs, however, that congressional regulation of
the judicial process may finally be attracting significant academic
attention. In recent years, four of the nation's most insightful
constitutional scholars have addressed some aspect of this topic.
In 1995, Professor Martin H. Redish concluded, as part of a
wide-ranging study of judicial independence, that Congress has
broad power to prescribe substantive and procedural rules for
the judiciary but that separation-of-powers principles place important limits on that power when its exercise affects the way in
which cases are decided.' According to Professor Redish, the
decisional independence principle precludes direct legislative
control of judicial outcomes,6 while the political commitment
principle7 forbids Congress from using the trappings and prestige
of the federal courts to hide substantive legislative decisions
from the electorate.8
In 1999, Professor David Engdahl identified the Sweeping
Clause of Article I, Section 8' as the constitutional source of
congressional power to regulate the jurisdictional, structural, and
decisional affairs of the federal courts.1 0 Professor Engdahl
urges courts to decide for themselves whether congressional
gress' power to regulate the substance and form of judicial decisions concerning injunctions in prison litigation); see also note 130.
5. Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political
Perspectives,46 Mercer L. Rev. 697 (1995).
6. See id. at 707-14.
7. This principle requires that legislation carry "some meaningful level of normative political commitment by the enacting legislators, thus enabling the electorate to
judge its representatives." Martin H. Redish, The Constitutionas PoliticalStructure 136
(Oxford U. Press, 1995).
8. For example, Professor Redish argues that if Congress adopts standard "A" as
a substantive rule of decision, it cannot then regulate the judicial decisionmaking process
in a way that effectively requires "B" as the outcome in adjudications-even if Congress
could have directly prescribed "B" as the governing substantive standard. See Redish, 46
Mercer L. Rev. at 715-16 (cited in note 5). Cf. Lawrence G. Sager, Klein's FirstPrinciple:
A Proposed Solution, 86 Georgetown L.J. 2525, 2529 (1998) (suggesting that United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871), stands for the analogous principle that
"[t]he judiciary will not permit its articulate authority to be subverted to serve ends antagonistic to its actual judgment; the judiciary will resist efforts to make it seem to support and regularize that with which it in fact disagrees").
9. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (declaring that Congress shall have power

"[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof"). Professor Engdahl, in accordance with modern practice, calls this clause the "Necessary and Proper Clause." The
founding generation, however, uniformly termed it the "Sweeping Clause."
10. See Engdahl, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 94-104 (cited in note 1).
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measures regulating the judiciary in fact aid or hinder the "carrying into Execution" of the judicial power, which he argues calls
into question the validity of such familiar statutes as the AntiInjunction Act, some of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and a
host of other measures designed to regulate the remedies and
procedures employed by the federal courts."
Two recent articles specifically consider the power of Congress to regulate the use of precedent by federal courts. Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen has urged adoption of a statute that
would forbid the federal courts from giving prior court decisions
any weight beyond their persuasive value in future cases involving the constitutionality of abortion regulations (or in constitutional cases more generally). 2 He agrees with Professor Engdahl that the Sweeping Clause is the key constitutional provision
for analyzing congressional power over the courts, but he finds
in that clause a power at least broad enough to restrict the use of
precedent in constitutional cases.' 3 And Professor John Harrison has argued for a similar, though perhaps narrower, congressional power under the Sweeping Clause to mandate any norm
14
of precedent that courts could reasonably adopt for themselves.
All of these authors make critical contributions to an exploration of this issue, but each of them misses an important piece
of the puzzle. Professor Redish correctly draws attention to the
importance of background norms of separation of powers, but he
does not discuss the central role played by the Sweeping Clause
in any assessment of congressional power to regulate the courts.
Professor Engdahl neatly articulates the role of the Sweeping
Clause, but his analysis of that clause is incomplete. Professor
Engdahl emphasizes the requirement that laws regulating the judiciary must be "for carrying into Execution" the judicial power,
but he pays scant attention to the separate requirement that such
laws be "necessary and proper" for that purpose. As I have
elsewhere explained at length, in conjunction with Patricia B.
Granger, the term "proper" in the Sweeping Clause is an impor11. See id. at 158-74.
12. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress
Remove the PrecedentialEffect of Roe and Casey?, 109 Yale L.J. 1535 (2000).
13. See id. at 1590-94.
14. John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over the Rules of Precedent, 50 Duke
L.J. 503 (2000). Professor Harrison's analysis may lead to a narrower view of congressional power than does Professor Paulsen's because the former pays more attention than
the latter to the requirement that congressional statutes actually "carry[] into Execution"
the judicial power. On the other hand, this may be more a difference of focus than of
substance.
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tant limitation on the scope of the power granted to Congress by
that clause.15 Professor Paulsen places the issue of congressional
power in its appropriate practical and historical context and recognizes the need to take account of the word "proper" in the
Sweeping Clause, but he fails to see that the term "proper"
draws much of its content from background separation-ofpowers principles, more or less (to complete the circle) in accordance with Professor Redish's analysis. Professor Harrison similarly does not give due regard to the extent to which separationof-powers concerns, and in particular Professor Redish's principle of decisional independence, are codified in the Sweeping
Clause.
What is needed for a full exploration of Congress' power to
regulate the affairs of the federal courts is a (no pun intended)
proper synthesis that gives due account to the text of the Sweeping Clause, the background norms that animate it, and the structural and historical context in which it is located. The result of
that synthesis is that Professor Paulsen's proposed precedentlimiting statute is clearly unconstitutional; Congress may not by
statute tell16 the federal courts whether or in what way to use
precedent.
I do not reach that conclusion because of any great fondness
for the doctrine of stare decisis. As Professor Paulsen notes, 7 he
and I are among the tiny handful of academics who think it is affirmatively unconstitutional for federal courts to rely on precedent in constitutional cases.'" Nonetheless, Congress does not

15. See generally Gary Lawson and Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of
Federal Power: A JurisdictionalInterpretationof the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267
(1993) (arguing that the word "proper" in the text of the Sweeping Clause requires exercises of federal power to be consistent with principles of federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights).
16. I concentrate on Professor Paulsen rather than Professor Harrison because the

former's proposal is more specific and far-ranging. Professor Harrison's characteristically insightful analysis is primarily concerned with identifying the sources and status of

rules of precedent. The resolution of our dispute probably requires addressing some
complex questions about the nature of decisionmaking that cannot be pursued here. See
note 58. My criticism of Professor Paulsen's proposed statute applies as well to Nick
Rosencranz's ingenious suggestion for a Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation that
would, under congressional direction, regularize the process of statutory interpretation in
federal courts. See Nick Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation
(manuscript of Sept. 15, 2001 on file with the author).
17. See Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1548 n.38 (cited in note 12).
18. See generally Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 23 (1994) (analogizing Marbury's reasoning supporting the constitutional case in favor of judicial review to the constitutional case against federal courts
using horizontal precedent to decide constitutional issues).
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have the power to tell the federal courts how to go about their
business of deciding cases, even if the courts' own methods for
deciding cases (such as reliance on precedent) are unconstitutionally wrong. This does not mean that the federal courts' use of
precedent or other decision-making methodologies is therefore
uncontrollable. To the contrary, the Constitution prescribes two
very important, and very powerful, methods for controlling the
actions of the federal courts. But the enactment of a congressional statute along Professor Paulsen's lines is not one of them.
Part I of this article briefly explores some preliminary
methodological matters that are essential for a proper understanding of this issue. Part II describes more carefully the scope
and limits of congressional power over the affairs of the federal
courts and explains why Professor Paulsen's proposed statute
exceeds those limits. Part III applies that analysis to some of the
existing statutes-several with very impressive pedigrees-that
currently regulate the decision-making practices of the federal
courts. Part IV then briefly sets forth the two constitutionally
permissible methods for controlling the decision-making methodologies of the federal courts.

I
Five preliminary points set the framework for a correct understanding of congressional power to regulate the affairs of the
federal courts. First, this article seeks to determine the original
meaning of the various clauses in the Constitution that define
and limit the power of Congress to regulate judicial decisionmaking. Under my strict originalist approach (which is markedly
stricter than the approach employed by most originalists), the
search for original meaning is precisely that: it is not a search for
explanations or justifications of current or past doctrine. Court
decisions and legislative and executive practices are neither constitutive nor generally good evidence of constitutional meaning,
and I treat them accordingly. Moreover, I make no normative
claims about the extent to which original meaning should guide
decisions. Originalism, as I apply it here, is a theory of interpretation, not a theory of adjudication.1 9 What people do with the
Constitution's meaning once they have it is their own business.

19. For a deeper exploration of the crucial difference between interpretation and
adjudication, and the decidedly contingent links between them, see generally Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes... and Constitutions, 85 Georgetown L.J. 1823 (1997).
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Although the participants in this debate have a substantial

range of methodological disagreements, they share enough
common premises to let the game proceed without a more extensive discussion of methodology (though I will address some
fine points along the way). Professors Paulsen and Harrison
both employ some variant of originalism, though the latter's
variant may be a bit more eclectic than mine. Professor Redish

styles himself a nonoriginalist textualist, and Professor Engdahl's
methodology, as with most of his work, defies easy classification.20 On structural issues, however, Professors Redish and
Engdahl strongly emphasize the central role of the original written text and the inferences that are fairly drawn from it. While
one could perhaps imagine serious differences emerging between originalist and nonoriginalist textualists on structural matters-if, for example, the nonoriginalists adopted some kind of
evolutionary theory of departmental powers-in practice those
differences have proved to be relatively small. 21 Accordingly, I
can (and do) take for granted some basic premises about
originalist methodology as applied to structural issues. That may
change, of course, if someone enters this debate from a widely

20. For Professor Redish, any interpretation of the Constitution must be consistent
with the document's language and overall structure, though he rejects strict reliance on
founding-era understandings. See Redish, The Constitution as PoliticalStructure at 6-16
(cited in note 7); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, and the
Constitution:A Textual and StructuralAnalysis, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 673, 679-82 (1999). Of
course, most modern originalists also reject any strict reliance on direct historical evidence of founding-era beliefs. The ultimate originalist inquiry is hypothetical: what
would a fully informed public at the time of ratification, knowing everything that there is
to know about the Constitution and the world around it, have understood a particular
term or clause to mean? Too great a focus on actual historical understandings can cloud
this inquiry; one must always be prepared to ask whether an expressed understanding
would have been different had the utterer known or thought about X, Y, and Z. Professor Redish may have more in common with originalists than he realizes, though to pursue
this would take us far afield. For a brief self-description of Professor Engdahl's distinctive methodology, see David E. Engdahl, What's in a Name? The Constitutionality of
Multiple "Supreme" Courts, 66 Ind. L. Rev. 457,504-10 (1991).
21. The differences are small because Professors Redish and Engdahl do not seek
to superimpose on the Constitution's structural design some theory of government radically different from that embodied in the original document. Accordingly, the inferences
that they draw from the constitutional structure are not grossly different from the inferences that would be drawn by a strict originalist. The gap between originalists and Professors Redish and Engdahl could be much larger on other issues in which, for example,
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment plays a central role. Professors Redish and
Engdahl also depart significantly from an originalist understanding of the scope of Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause and Sweeping Clause, but that may reflect
more a difference in application than in underlying methodology.
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divergent perspective, but there will be time enough to address
those concerns if and when it becomes necessary.22
Second, it is important to be clear on exactly which clauses
of the Constitution are relevant to this inquiry. Apart from the
Appointments Clause, which enables the federal courts to receive from Congress the power to appoint inferior federal officers, 23 there is only one clause of the Constitution that confers
power on the federal courts to act: the Article III Vesting
Clause, which provides that "[t]he judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. ' '24 Other clauses define the classes of disputes in which this
power may be exercised 21 or require the use of certain practices
and procedures,2 6 but the Vesting Clause is the Constitution's
sole affirmative Trant of power to the federal courts to act in a
judicial capacity.
Similarly, there is only one clause of the Constitution (apart
from the Appointments Clause) that empowers Congress to
regulate the affairs of the judicial department: the Sweeping
Clause, which provides that Congress shall have power "[t]o
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof., 28 This conclusion will seem strange to many contemporary observersincluding many who hold federal judicial commissions. Courts
and scholars have long assumed that Congress' power "[to] constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court" 9 carries with it,
22. Of course, there really won't be time enough to do so then. Before one gets to
the relative merits of originalism and other interpretative approaches, one must be able
to define precisely what an originalist (or any other) inquiry entails. Even to identify the
relevant questions for such a project would require a book (which I am planning), though
a few of those questions unavoidably surface below. For some very preliminary thoughts
on the mechanics of originalism, see Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 550-59 (1994); see also Mark D.
Greenberg and Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 Georgetown L.J.
569 (1998); Lawson, 85 Georgetown L.J. at 1823-1836 (cited in note 19).
23. See U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
24. U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
25. See U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, cls. 1-2.
26. See Gary Lawson and Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1273 n.18 (1996).
27. For a definitive discussion of this point, see generally Steven G. Calabresi, The
Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1377 (1994).
28. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
29. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
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by implication, some measure of power to regulate the affairs of
those inferior courts.3 ° Professor Engdahl, however, has recently
demonstrated that the Tribunals Clause and the Sweeping
Clause mean exactly what they say. The former gives Congress
power to create inferior courts, while the latter gives Congress
power to regulate the affairs of those courts (and the Supreme
Court as well). 3 It is unnecessary to rehearse here Professor
Engdahl's structural and historical arguments, because the conclusion emerges upon careful reflection. The Tribunals Clause
no more carries with it implicit powers than does the Bankruptcy
Clause 32 or the Postal Roads Clause. 3 The Sweeping Clause is
the explicit textual source of Congress' power to pass ancillary
legislation "for carrying into Execution" any constitutionally
granted powers. The reference in the Sweeping Clause to "all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof,"
which clearly includes the "judicial Power" vested in the federal
courts, makes it clear beyond cavil that the Sweeping Clause is
the specific textual vehicle for congressional legislation with respect to the operations of the judicial department. And because
the Sweeping Clause is the source of congressional power in this
area, that clause also defines the scope and limits of Congress'
power.
Third, the Sweeping Clause contains two important limitations on the scope of its granted power. As Professor Engdahl
emphasizes, any laws enacted by Congress to regulate the affairs
of a coordinate department 34 must be "for carrying into Execu30. Similarly, the assumption has long been that Congress acquires some measure
of power over the Supreme Court's jurisdiction from the clause declaring that the Supreme Court "shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. Const., Art. III,
§ 2, cl.
2.
31. See Engdahl, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 104-19 (cited in note 1). Similarly, in a
discussion that ought to have a seismic impact on federal courts scholarship, Professor
Engdahl elegantly demonstrates that the exceptions clause refers to a congressional
power to regulate the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction but does not confer that
power. See id. at 119-32. Note that the conventional account, which locates congressional power to regulate judicial affairs in the Tribunals Clause, only generates congressional power over the lower federal courts. By contrast, whatever power Congress derives from the Sweeping Clause extends as well to the Supreme Court. Anyone who is
skeptical that such long-established understandings could be so thoroughly undermined
by a modern law review article should consider this a challenge to rebut Professor Engdahl's claims on the basis of original meaning.
32. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
33. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
34. Pursuant to my obsession with the terminology of the founding generation: The
founders almost uniformly used the term "departments" to refer to the legislative, execu-
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tion" the powers vested in that department. Moreover, any law
for carrying into execution federal powers must be "necessary
and proper" for that purpose. A law is "necessary" if it bears a
suitable causal relationship to the end in question; how close a
"fit" between means and ends this requires is a matter of considerable controversy. 35 For present purposes, however, the more
important term in the Sweeping Clause is the word "proper."
Patricia B. Granger and I have elsewhere explored at considerable length the original meaning of the word "proper" in the
Sweeping Clause. 36 In brief, a "proper" executory law must con-

form to the Constitution's terms and design, including the background norms of federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights that underlie the document. A statute that trenches on
prerogatives that (for want of a better word) properly belong to
another department or institution is improper and therefore beyond Congress' enumerated powers.37
Fourth, the centrality of the Sweeping Clause to this inquiry
has important methodological implications. Professor Paulsen is
skeptical of the use of abstract conceptions of separation of
powers as a tool of constitutional interpretation, objecting that
"[t]here is no freestanding 'Separation of Powers Clause' that
contains its own statute-invalidating set of rules or standards;
38
there is only the collection of texts that make up the system.
That is not entirely right. The Sweeping Clause is precisely (in
part) just such a "Separation of Powers Clause." Professor
Paulsen is correct that the Constitution adopts a specific,
blended scheme for allocating governmental power rather than
some pure theoretical model and that one must be careful to
tive, and judicial institutions of the national government, reserving the term "branches"
for the different houses of the legislative department. See Steven G. Calabresi and
Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, PluralJudiciary, 105
Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1156 n.6 (1992).
35. Compare Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 745
(1997) (urging a strict interpretation of necessity) with Lawson and Granger, 43 Duke
L.J. at 286-89 (cited in note 15) (intimating that Chief Justice Marshall may have been
right in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), to offer a more generous
account of necessity).
36. See Lawson and Granger, 43 Duke L.J. at 291-297 (cited in note 15).
37. All of the relevant inquiries under the Sweeping Clause are objective; the Constitution does not commit interpretation of the Sweeping Clause exclusively to Congress.
See id. at 276-85.
38. Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1582 n.121 (cited in note 12).
39. See generally Arnold I. Burns and Stephen J. Markman, UnderstandingSeparation of Powers, 7 Pace L. Rev. 575 (1987) (rejecting abstract separation of powers theories and arguing for a strict textualist interpretation of the Constitution when analyzing
separation of powers issues).
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avoid reading overly general conceptions of separation of powers into the Constitution. But there is simply no way to understand, for example, the "executive" and "judicial" powers or the
scope of congressional authority to regulate the execution of
these powers without reference to theoretical background norms
about the Constitution's separation of powers. One can criticize
particular conclusions about how broadly or narrowly the background separation-of-powers norms cut, but that does not mean
that some such norms do not operate at a constitutional level.
Nor are such norms "freestanding." A "proper" separation of
powers argument is as fully textual as is, for example, an argument about the meaning of the word "officer" in the Appointments Clause.4 °
The fifth, and final, preliminary point concerns the practical
and historical context of the debate concerning congressional
power over judicial affairs. Professor Paulsen devotes much of
his analysis to a demonstration that his proposed precedentrestricting statute is consistent with long-established doctrinal
understandings about congressional power to regulate the judicial process. 4' He is entirely right about this. Congress routinely
regulates the manner in which courts decide cases, from choiceof-law rules to rules of evidence to standards of review. A
conclusion that Congress cannot forbid certain uses of precedent
does indeed call into question many of these long-held assumptions about congressional power and is clearly more radical in its
implications than Professor Paulsen's proposal, which requires at
most a very modest extension of well-settled law. Professor
Paulsen has history, practice, and doctrine on his side. Indeed,
he has everything except the Constitution.
40. See U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. But if one must discern background understandings in order to determine the contours of a "proper" approach to separation of
powers, federalism, and individual rights, what textual work does the Sweeping Clause
perform? See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism:United States v. Lopez, 1995 S.
Ct. Rev. 125, 201 (raising this objection in connection with "proper" principles of federalism). That is a separate topic, but the short answer is threefold. First, the Sweeping
Clause gives these background principles textual grounding, if one cares about such
things (as Professor Paulsen and I do). It is, as Professor Paulsen intimates, more difficult to claim constitutional status for a free-standing norm than to use such norms to interpret language that is well structured to receive them. Second, channeling the inquiry
through a text shapes the inquiry into the appropriate background norms. Third, if the
Sweeping Clause is the primary vehicle through which these norms are constitutionalized, then the norms may not apply (or may not apply in the same way) to legislation enacted pursuant to the District or Territories/Property Clauses or by direct exercises of the
other Article I, Section 8 powers. For more discussion of my obsession with the Sweeping Clause, see notes 74-75.
41. See Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1582-90 (cited in note 12).
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II
Start with some easy cases. Congress clearly has the power
to affect the process of judicial decision-making in many ways.
Courts, for example, must apply valid congressional statutes as
substantive law in cases to which they apply and even give them
preference over many other sources of substantive law with
which they may conflict.42 What else could "legislative Powers"
possibly mean? Thus, whenever it enacts a substantive statute,
Congress controls to some extent-and possibly to a dispositive
extent -how courts will decide cases.

It is just as clear, however, that Congress cannot enact a
statute instructing a federal court to decide a specific case in a
specific way. Everyone, including Professor Paulsen, agrees with
this much. Nor could Congress pass a general statute providing, for example, that in any case raising a question concerning
the constitutionality of a statute restricting abortion, the court
must rule for/against the plaintiff.
Why not? Why can't Congress tell the federal courts how to
decide specific cases, or classes of cases, given that Congress has
the undoubted power to determine to a large extent the substantive law that courts must apply? Perhaps discovering the true
reasons for the obvious can help us analyze the non-obvious.
One wrong turn is to say that such an outcome-directing
statute would violate the Fifth Amendment by depriving the losing party
of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of
,4
law, because due process of law requires a fair chance to win
in an impartial forum. This is right as far as it goes, but it does
not go far enough. It would mean that if the interests at stake in
the case were not "life, liberty, or property," then Congress
could direct the outcome even in a particular case.45 Furthermore, it would mean that Congress only lost the power to direct
case outcomes in 1791, when the Fifth Amendment was ratified.
Neither conclusion is unthinkable, but both are odd enough to
give one pause.

42. See U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl.2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land").
43. See Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1568 (cited in note 12). See also United States v.
Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).

44.

U.S. Const., Amend. V.

45.

See Redish, 46 Mercer L. Rev. at 709 (cited in note 5).
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The Due Process Clause is simply the wrong place to look
for answers to these kinds of problems. The Bill of Rights today
is usually the first resort for a limitation on congressional power
when, as an original matter, it should be second in line. The
Constitution limits the power of federal institutions primarily
through the scheme of enumerated powers. The Bill of Rights in
1791 did not significantly alter the legal landscape; it merely
clarified, and to a very limited extent expanded, the range of
limitations on the federal government that was already part of
the constitutional design in 1789.46 Outside of federal territories
and enclaves, very few statutes were constitutional in 1790 but
unconstitutional in 1792.
Instead of running to the Due Process Clause, we should
first look to the scheme of enumerated powers. The place to begin an inquiry concerning the powers of the federal judiciary is
with the enumerated powers-or, more precisely, the enumerated power-of the federal judiciary. The only clause that affirmatively empowers the federal judiciary to act in a judicial capacity is the Vesting Clause of Article III, which states that
"[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish., 47 Any power exercised
by a federal court must stem either from this grant of the "judicial Power" or from a federal statute that is "necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution" the judicial power.
Historical research tells us almost nothing about what this
"judicial Power" was likely to be understood to entail in 1789.48
Professor Paulsen notes, for example, that the claim that the judicial power "includes the power to vest precedent with authoritative, decision-altering weight, independent of its persuasiveness" 49 was not made "by anyone in the Constitutional
Convention; nor by any prominent (or even obscure) framer or
ratifier at the time of the drafting, debate over, and early implementation of the Constitution; nor even by any prominent oppo46. For an elaboration of this point, see Gary Lawson, The Bill of Rights as an Exclamation Point, 33 U. Richmond L. Rev. 511 (1999) (asserting that the original Constitution and not the Bill of Rights is the proper primary vehicle for determining the permissible scope of government action and individual rights).
47. U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1.
48. Lest one lose focus, one must always remember that originalism is a search for
hypothetical rather than actual historical understanding. See note 20. But history is not
irrelevant; it is generally hard to determine what a hypothetical audience would have
thought without reference to what real audiences actually thought.
49. Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1571 (cited in note 12).
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nent in the ratification debates or Anti-Federalist literature."5 0

This is not a surprising conclusion; one could say the same about
virtually every proposition concerning the meaning of the "judicial Power." "The judicial Power" simply was not a term that
received serious attention during the founding period."' Nor
does the silence necessarily reflect consensus. The "judicial
Power" in 1789 was not a term with a lengthy, well-understood
history. Indeed, the notion of "judicial Power" as a distinct aspect of governmental power, rather than as a manifestation of
legislative or executive power, was a relatively recent innovation
in the late eighteenth century. 2

About all that we can say with certainty about the "judicial
Power" is that it is the power to decide cases in accordance with
governing law.53 But why isn't a law that directs the outcome in
a case part of that governing law? After all, to say that courts
have the power to decide cases is not necessarily to say that no
other institution can guide, or even direct, that power. The Constitution does not expressly say that "no other Institution of the
federal Government shall instruct the Courts in their Exercise of
the judicial Power." Indeed, the Sweeping Clause provides su-

perficially plausible grounds for claiming the contrary.

The reason that Congress cannot direct the outcome in a
particular case (or class of cases) is that such a law would not be
"necessary and proper" for carrying into execution the judicial
50. Id. I assume that Professor Paulsen was as unimpressed as was I by the recent
attempt by an Eighth Circuit panel to ground precedent in the Constitution's original
meaning: See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding unconstitutional a rule forbidding precedential reliance on unpublished opinions), vac'd as moot
on reh'g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Richard H. Fallon, Stare Decisis
and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 570,
578-82 (2001) (offering a perfunctory originalist defense of stare decisis).
51. See Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1272-74 (cited in note 26). Mr.
Moore spent a good portion of his third year of law school looking for direct historical
sources concerning the meaning of the "judicial Power," and neither he nor I came up
with anything interesting. Others who have undertaken the quest have fared little better.
See generally James S. Liebman and William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The
Quantity and Quality of Decisionmakingrequired of Article III Courts, 98 Colum. L. Rev.
696 (1998). Professor Liebman and Mr. Ryan, however, have demonstrated that the
sparse sources that exist tend to support an inference of decisional independence. See
notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
52. See Redish, The Constitution as PoliticalStructure at 103-05 (cited in note 7)
(discussing pre-American conceptions of separated powers that did not include the judicial power as a distinct governmental function). For an intriguing discussion of early
eighteenth-century linkages between legislative and judicial powers, see generally Christine A. Desan, The ConstitutionalCommitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early
American Tradition,111 Harv. L. Rev. 1381 (1998).
53. See Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1273 (cited in note 26).

204

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 18:191

power. It probably fails even a generous test of necessity. And
it would not be "proper" because it would violate a constitutional background norm that says that each department of the
national government must be independent of the other departments in its exercise of enumerated functions unless the Constitution directs otherwise. 4 That principle, in turn, is gleaned
from our best understanding of what a fully informed public in
1789 would have regarded as a "proper" scheme of separated
powers in the context of the Constitution.
Where the text of the Constitution directs a particular allocation of governmental power, that allocation must be respected-even when that allocation violates pure theoretical
conceptions of separated powers (as is arguably the case, for example, with the Presentment Clause of article I, section 7, which
gives the executive a direct role in the legislative process). But
what happens when the text is silent? One possible answer is
that the Sweeping Clause gives Congress authority to fill in all
gaps without limitation.5 5 Another possible answer, however, is
that there are certain background principles that define the
"proper" allocation of powers in the absence of direct constitutional specification. The latter answer is overwhelmingly more
plausible. The whole point of vesting three distinct kinds of governmental power in three distinct institutions is to create independent power centers. Just as the vesting clauses generate a
principle of departmental coordinacy, under which each department has a distinct obligation to construe the laws and Constitution, 6 they also generate a principle of departmental independence, under which each department should be understood to
operate outside the direct control of other departments unless
the Constitution instructs to the contrary. This principle of departmental independence is, at a minimum, a good starting
point for determining whether a statutory allocation of power is

54. One could also try to say that such a law would not really be "for carrying into
Execution" the judicial power. That assumes, however, that the judicial power includes
an independent power to reach legal conclusions without legislative direction, which is
precisely the proposition about to be established. Once one has established that proposition, the requirement that executory laws actually carry the judicial power into execution
begins to have bite.
55. Peter Strauss has come very close to endorsing this position on occasion. See
Peter L. Strauss, Formaland FunctionalApproaches to Separation-of-PowersQuestions A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 492-93 (1987).
56. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to
Say What the Law Is, 83 Georgetown L.J. 217, 228-29 (1994).
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constitutionally "proper" when the Constitution is otherwise silent.
The case for this principle of decisional independence, as

Professor Redish aptly terms it," is very strong. I have elsewhere, in conjunction with Christopher D. Moore, defended at
length the proposition that federal courts, in the exercise of their

power of constitutional review, are generally not obliged to give
deference to the constitutional views of Congress or the President. 8 Many of those arguments support the additional proposition that Congress cannot alter that background principle by or-

dinary legislation pursuant to the Sweeping Clause.
First, "all three departments of the national government are
equally created by the Constitution, are 'coequal in title and
rank as representatives of the People,' and all owe allegiance

first and foremost to the Constitution that empowers them."59
This postulate of coordinacy most reasonably entails a principle
of decisional independence among the departments, especially as
no department is expressly granted a power of constitutional interpretation but all three departments possess such power by
implication from other granted powers. It would be exceedingly
odd (even though not entirely unthinkable) if Congress could

undo this structural coordinacy by a simple statute.
Second, one of the obvious purposes of the Constitution's
intricate scheme of separated powers "is to ensure that govern-

ment action generally takes place only when distinct actors with
distinct roles and functions all agree that the action is permissi-

ble."6 ° Interpretative independence is a natural corollary of this
57. See Redish, 46 Mercer L. Rev. at 699 (cited in note 5).
58. See Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1274-79 (cited in note 26). I have
similarly argued that the President is generally not bound by the views of Congress or the
courts. See Gary Lawson, Everything I Need to Know About Presidents I Learned From
Dr. Seuss, 24 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 381 (2001). There are important exceptions to this
general principle of interpretative independence. Most importantly, one must distinguish
between legal deference, which gives weight to the views of another actor simply because
of that actor's status, and epistemological deference, which gives weight to the views of
another actor because there are reasons to believe that that actor's views are good evidence of the right answer. Epistemological deference can shade into legal deference if an
actor's status is, by itself, reason enough to think that the actor is more likely than the
court to get the right answer. For a more elaborate discussion of legal and epistemological deference, see Lawson & Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1277-79, 1300 (cited in note 26).
The distinction between legal and epistemological deference probably underlies
most of my disagreements with Professor Harrison on this topic, but that would require a
separate article to explore.
59. Id. at 1275-76 (quoting Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L.J. at 229) (cited in note 56)).
60. Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1276 (cited in note 26). There are times,
of course, when the Constitution expressly permits action by fewer than three depart-
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constitutional scheme of divided powers. It would be exceedingly odd (even though not entirely unthinkable) if Congress
could undo this structural requirement of departmental consensus by a simple statute.
Third, at least in a case in which Congress' own power is at
issue, allowing Congress to dictate the outcome of the case
would permit Congress to be the judge in its own cause.6 This
would violate one of the most venerable precepts in AngloAmerican law, 62 which makes it an unlikely (though not impossible) candidate for a "proper" eighteenth-century understanding of Congress' powers. More pointedly, "the Constitution on a
few occasions specifically and expressly makes certain actors the
judges of the scope of their powers., 63 The best inference is that
those express grants are exceptions from the normal rule of departmental coordinacy and independence. It would be exceedingly odd (even though not entirely unthinkable) if Congress
could undo this careful allocation of interpretative authority by a
simple statute.
Fourth, a specific proposal to permit Congress to regulate
the manner in which federal courts decide cases was rejected by
the Constitutional Convention. By a six-to-two vote, the Convention defeated a provision that would have provided that, in
all cases outside the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, "the
judicial power shall be exercised in such manner as the Legislature shall direct., 64 The rejection of this proposal, which preserved "the otherwise constitutionally sacrosanct quality of federal judging,"6"
supports the principle of decisional
independence.66
ments. The President, for example, has nothing to say about the House or Senate's selection of their own officers. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers"); U.S. Const., Art. I, § 3, cl. 4 ("The
Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate"); U.S. Const., Art. I,
§ 3, cl. 5 ("The Senate shall chuse their other Officers"). Whether the courts have any
role in that process is a tale for another time.
61. See Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1276-77 (cited in note 26).
62. See id. at 1276.
63. Id. For discussion of these clauses, see Lawson and Granger, 43 Duke L.J. at
277-78 (cited in note 15).
64. Max Farrand, ed., 2 The Records of the FederalConvention of 1787 at 425 (Yale
U. Press 1911).
65. Liebman and Ryan, 98 Colum. L. Rev. at 754 n.271 (cited in note 51).
66. See id. How strongly it supports the principle depends on how much weight
one wants to assign to this kind of Convention maneuvering and how confidently one can
trust the historical records. The short answers are, respectively, "not that much" and
"tolerably well when the result coheres with other sources." On the latter point, see generally James H. Hutson, The Creationof the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documen-

2001]

CONTROLLING PRECEDENT

None of these (or other related) propositions about the
Constitution, separation of powers, or the Sweeping Clause can
be absolutely demonstrated by smoking-gun evidence, but all of
them, based on our best inferences about the scheme of the Constitution, are knowable with a high degree of confidence. Professor Redish is entirely right to glean a principle of "decisional
independence" for the federal courts as a background norm that
helps define the "proper" separation of powers. The Constitution gives the federal judiciary the power to decide cases in accordance with governing law, and Congress cannot direct the exercise of that power under the guise of the Sweeping Clause.
What if the substantive law does not directly command a
decision for one party but is so narrowly tailored that it effectively prescribes the outcome for a pending case or ongoing controversy? This is a swamp that I had hoped to avoid until a subsequent article, but two commentators on this manuscript have
pushed me into it here.
The nondelegation doctrine, in its originalist form, limits the
extent to which statutes can leave important issues unresolved.67
Does the Constitution also impose a maximum as well as a
minimum degree of specificity on regulatory statutes? The Constitution's prohibitions on bills of attainder forbid one form of
specificity, but is there a broader constitutional rule against stat-69
utes that, in effect, control the outcome of court proceedings?
The classic case is State of Pennsylvaniav. Wheeling and Belmont
Bridge Company.7 ° The Court had previously held that a particular bridge over the Ohio River was enjoinable as a nuisance
because of its potential to obstruct navigation.7 1 Congress responded with a statute declaring "[t]hat the bridges across the
Ohio River at Wheeling, in the State of Virginia, and at Bridge-

tary Record, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1986) (discussing problems with the reliability of founding-era sources); Lawson and Granger, 43 Duke L.J. at 334-35 (cited in note 15) (defending certain limited uses of these sources despite their potential inaccuracy).
67. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and OriginalMeaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. - (2002)
(forthcoming).

68. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl.
3; U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl.
1.
69. Pure appropriations measures, most notably private bills, are often quite specific. Those statutes do not raise concerns relevant to this article because they do not
normally prescribe judicial outcomes. The particular specificity problem that I am addressing here concerns the relationship between the legislative and judicial departments.
Whether there might be similar problems in the relationship between the legislative and
executive departments is yet another matter.
70. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
71. See State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13
How.) 518 (1851).
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port, in the State of Ohio, abutting on Zane's Island, in said
river, are hereby declared to be lawful structures in their present
position and elevation, and shall be so held and taken to be, any,
thing in the law or laws of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding., 72 In a suit to lift the injunction to permit construction of a new bridge with essentially the same dimensions as
the old one, a divided Court applied the statute and accordingly
lifted the injunction. Was this an impermissible congressional
attempt to control the judicial process, akin to a statute saying
"Decide a motion for termination of the injunction in favor of
the Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Company"?
In terms of effect, the statute declaring the bridges to be
lawful was pretty clearly the same as a statute declaring the
company the advance winner of a subsequent lawsuit for termination of the injunction; the bridge was only a continuing nuisance if it was in fact an obstacle to navigation, and the congressional statute purported to determine that fact. Congress clearly
could have passed a general statute defining the criteria for obstructions to navigation (thereby preempting contrary state or
general tort law). Congress just as clearly could not have simply
declared the bridge company to be the winner in the upcoming
litigation. On which line does the actual statute in Wheeling
Bridge fall? It is not sufficient to say that upholding the law
would elevate form over substance. 73 That is clearly true, but for
originalists, form often matters as much or more than substance.
Many statutes effectively preordain the outcomes of litigation;
there is little point in passing the statutes if they do not.
I do not propose to resolve these issues here (though I hope
to resolve them in the future as part of a larger study of the Constitution's rules for statutory form and generality). For now, I
make just one observation about the inquiry. If the Constitution
contains a rule about the extent to which statutes either must or
must not resolve issues for litigation, the rule must stem from the
Sweeping Clause; there is no other text at hand to do the trick.7 4
72. Act of Aug. 31, 1852 § 6, 10 Stat. 110, 112 (1852). Section 7 of the statute further declared the bridges to be post roads, but the Court avoided basing its decision on
this designation.
73. See Sager, 86 Georgetown. L.J. at 2526-27 (cited in note 8).
74. Why can't one simply say that the principle of decisional independence is part

of the "judicial Power" (and the "executive Power"), and thus limits Congress' authority,
with or without reference to the Sweeping Clause? One probably can, but only up to a

point. If there was a thick, well understood conception of the judicial power in the late
eighteenth century, one could avoid most of these questions simply by reference to that
conception. But there was not, so any background principles that do not find textual ex-
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Cases like Wheeling Bridge then pose a special puzzle. The statute in Wheeling Bridge was at least arguably a direct exercise of
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce and not an

executory law for implementing the commerce power. Can it
really be the case that the Constitution imposes different rules of
specificity (or generality) based on something as contingent as
whether Congress can enact the statute in question without the

Sweeping Clause? The answer is yes, which is why background
principles of generality, such as the nondelegation doctrine and

whatever specificity rule the Constitution may contain, do not
apply to legislation under the District Clause or the Territo-

ries/Property Clause. 7' The same is true of legislation under the
pression must operate at a fairly high level of generality. That poses the "Paulsen problem" of letting free-standing norms run amok. The Constitution is an "impure" compromise that is certainly based on understandings about separated powers but does not
uniformly embody a single coherent theory. For example, the Presentment Clauses give
the President some degree of legislative power, the President of the Senate Clause does
the same for the Vice President, and the Appointments Clause gives courts some measure of the executive/legislative appointment power. More pointedly, the Sweeping
Clause expressly authorizes Congress to legislate with respect to the other departments'
powers. That express authorization limits the extent to which one can say that the very
nature of the judicial and executive powers precludes legislative interference; the Constitution quite obviously contemplates some measure of interference, regardless of what
some "pure" theory might tell us. The question then becomes what degree of departure
from purity the Constitution contemplates, and that question can only be answered by
carefully examining the enumerated powers that permit interference. Perhaps one can
derive a rule against direct legislative control of judicial (or executive) outcomes from
the very existence of a scheme of separated powers, but any limitations on legislation
that stray very far from that extreme probably need some "internal" constitutional
grounding-even if those internal norms direct our attention to external understandings.
Hence, the "necessary and proper" and "for carrying into Execution" requirements of
the Sweeping Clause must play an essential role in structural constitutional analysis.
75. This explains why Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429 (1992),
does not present the same problems as Wheeling Bridge. The statute at issue in Robertson, which essentially defined certain timber harvesting activities as compliant with applicable federal laws, regulated timber harvesting on federal lands and was thus an exercise of the Property Clause power. Perhaps one can read a specificity requirement into
that clause's authorization of "needful Rules and Regulations respecting the ... Property
belonging to the United States," U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added), but that
is a much tougher task than finding such a requirement in the Sweeping Clause.
Does this mean that Congress can prescribe judicial outcomes under the District or
Territories/Property Clauses? (Such a statute clearly could not be a direct exercise of
any of Congress' other powers.) The answer is a somewhat involved "no (or at least
mostly no)." If one can simply rule out direct legislative control of judicial outcomes as
inherent in a scheme of separated powers, see note 74, then the question is easy. If not,
matters get complicated. Prior to 1791, the unqualified language of the District Clause
arguably did permit Congress to control judicial outcomes, though such a statute probably would not have survived even the minimal requirement of needfulness under the Territories/Property Clause. The ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 had some interesting, and probably unintended, effects on Congress' power over the District, territories,
and federal property. The first nine amendments extended some of the principles of limited government into the otherwise general legislative authority of Congress over these
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other Article I, Section 8 powers, with this important difference:
Congress almost never needs the Sweeping Clause to legislate
for the District of Columbia, territories, or federal property, but
it almost always needs the Sweeping Clause to effectuate its
other powers. The statute in Wheeling Bridge, if it is truly an exercise of the commerce power, is one of the few examples of a
self-contained, self-executing statute under the Commerce
Clause. If a statute requires any penalty or enforcement provisions, those provisions must be enacted pursuant to the Sweeping Clause, and one must then ask whether it is "proper" to authorize enforcement of a statute that violates norms of generality
(if indeed the substantive statute does so). As for the other Article I, Section 8 powers: some of them seem to require by their
terms some measure of generality,7 6 others contemplate highly
specific legislation, 7 and still others are ambiguous.78 A full
study of this question thus requires a careful analysis of each of
Congress' enumerated powers-which is one of the many reasons that I do not want to say any more about it here.
So Congress can (to an extent) provide the federal courts
with substantive law but cannot directly command the outcome
of a case. What about the identification of the relevant facts and
law and the process of reasoning to a case outcome? Is that
process of decision-making subject to congressional control by
statute?
The judicial power of course includes the power to reason to
the outcome of a case. One cannot decide cases without bringing to bear some decision-making methodology for identifying
and applying the relevant facts and law, so a grant of the judicial
power must include a grant of the power to reason from facts
and law to conclusions. Can Congress control that reasoning
power by using the Sweeping Clause to dictate the decisionmaking methodology that courts must employ? The answer, as
areas. To the extent that life, liberty, or property are at stake in the litigation, the extension of due process principles to the District and territories might well forbid legislative
control of judicial judgments. And in cases that do not involve life, liberty, or property,
the question turns on whether one can fairly characterize the right to a judicial decision

that is not predetermined as a "right[]

...

retained by the people." U.S. Const., Amend.

Ix.
76. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (authorizing Congress "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States").
77. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 7 (giving Congress power "[t]o establish Post Offices and post Roads").
78. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (authorizing Congress "[t]o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces").
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an inference from the principle of departmental independence,
must be no. The process of decision-making is so tied up with
the process of reaching a decision that it must be the "proper"
province of the judicial department in the same way and to the
same degree as the power to reach an outcome. Indeed, it is almost silly to say that the core of the judicial power is merely the
power to reach a result, without reference to the process by
which that result is reached. Accordingly, Congress can pass
substantive laws, but it cannot tell the courts how to identify,
construe, and apply them. And because we are dealing with a
simple absence of congressional power, the purported justification for the exercise of the power is irrelevant. Even if the
courts are applying a wrongheaded, or even unconstitutionally
wrongheaded, method of decision-making, the Sweeping Clause
does not empower Congress to prescribe a different process.
This conclusion straightforwardly rules out a statute regulating the courts' use of precedent. The proof of any proposition,
including propositions of law, requires three elements: principles
of admissibility (what counts toward proving a proposition?),
principles of significance (how much does the admissible evidence count?), and standards of proof (how much evidence is
needed to establish the truth of the proposition?). 9 Each element is essential to the disposition of any legal question, and
congressional regulation of any element therefore violates the
principle of departmental independence and is thus not
"proper." This rules out statutes concerning the selection of materials for consideration (principles of legal admissibility), statutes concerning the weight or relevance to be given to various
materials (principles of significance) or statutes concerning the
amount of proof needed, either at trial or on appeal, to establish
the legal truth of a proposition (standards of proof). Professor
Paulsen's proposed statute squarely regulates both the admissibility and significance of precedent in judicial decision-making
and is therefore unconstitutional. And that is true even if Congress is right and the courts are wrong about how best to decide
cases.
Professor Paulsen's case against this "structural argument,"
as he aptly terms it, is as elegantly simple as the argument itself:
(1) unless the Constitution prescribes a specific methodology,
such as a specific method for assigning weight to precedent, the
79. See generally Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 859 (1992)
(discussing the structure of propositional proof).
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choice of a methodology is ultimately a judgment of policy, and
judge-made policies cannot prevail over congressional statutes,
(2) the structural argument leads to an unchecked judiciary,
which is "at odds with the Constitution's most fundamental
structural postulate,"8 ° and (3) the structural argument is inconsistent with a wide range of doctrinal understandings, including
some from the founding era. In Part IV of this article, I will
demonstrate that proposition (2) is incorrect. Proposition (3) is
correct, but it is relevant to this argument only to the extent that
it bears on original meaning. In Part III, I will show that Professor Paulsen's doctrinal examples say little about original meaning.
The essence of Professor Paulsen's critique of the structural
argument is therefore proposition (1), which is nicely summed
up in the following passage:
The [structural] argument claims the existence of penumbral
judicial powers to prescribe rules of policy that trump the
rules of law that the courts would otherwise find to be contained in the Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United
States. Unless the argument is that the Constitution dictates a
specific doctrine of stare decisis-and neither the courts nor
any credible scholar has ever made such a claim, to my
knowledge-the claim would have to be that the judiciary is
constitutionally empowered to devise one of its own choosing,
without limitation, by virtue of Article III's grant of "[tihe judicial Power" and the idea of separation of powers generally.
That is pushing penumbras too far and misusing the idea of
separation of powers.81
Apart from the last sentence, Professor Paulsen has it exactly
right. The federal courts have precisely the power to choose decision-making methodologies free of statutory control. If one
wants to call that power "penumbral" rather than, say, "derived
from background principles that define the 'proper' scope of
Congress' power to legislate for other departments," so be it.
And if one wants to call the prescription of decision-making
methodologies a matter of "policy" rather than, say, "the determination of meta-norms for law-finding and fact-finding," so be
that too.
The stakes in this debate are quite high. Suppose that Congress enacts a statute that says: "In deciding cases, the federal
80.
81.

See Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1581 (cited in note 12).
Id. at 1581-82.
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courts may not consider any federal statute that is not cited by
the parties in their briefs. In construing such statutes, the courts
shall treat statements in congressional committee reports as conclusive evidence of statutory meaning [subject, perhaps, to certain rules for choosing among reports if there are inconsistent
statements in different reports]." Is any part of this statute unconstitutional?
The first sentence determines the manner in which the
courts must identify relevant federal statutory law. In the absence of such a statute, the courts would have to determine for
themselves which of the numerous federal statutes on the books
constitute relevant law for the cases before them. Can it be said
that the Constitution prescribes a specific method for ascertaining the relevant law? I doubt it. There may be certain methods
that are clearly beyond the pale of the judicial power and therefore unconstitutional (such as picking relevant statutes by random lot or astrological divination), but any assessment of relevance requires an inescapable element of judgment and is
therefore an unlikely candidate for codification, especially indirect codification through a vesting of the "judicial Power." In
that sense, the choice of a methodology for ascertaining the relevant law would have to fall on Professor Paulsen's "nonconstitutional policy" side of the ledger.
The same can be said concerning the statute's second sentence, which prescribes a method for determining statutory
meaning. Even if one believes that the Constitution mandates
an original public meaning approach to statutory interpretation,
there are many different ways to identify and process evidence
of that meaning. The choice among those methods, including
how much weight to give to particular forms of legislative history, is surely a question of nonconstitutional policy, in Professor
Paulsen's terms.
Now consider some powers of the President under Article
II-an analogy that Professor Paulsen briefly acknowledges.82
The President has the power to execute the laws, including
power to exercise a measure of enforcement discretion. The
Constitution clearly does not mandate any one method for exercising such discretion (though it places some methods out of
bounds), so the selection of enforcement priorities is, within a
very broad range, a matter of nonconstitutional policy. May

82.

See id. at 1579 n.119.
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Congress therefore enact a statute providing, for example, "In
exercising enforcement discretion under statute X, the President
may not consider the extent to which prosecutions under this
statute will burden resources for prosecutions under other statutes"?8 3

I am quite confident that Professor Paulsen would endorse a
constitutional power in Congress to enact each of these statutes
(or if he objected, the objection would involve the specific form
or content of the statute and another could be drawn up that did
not raise those concerns). I am equally persuaded that both
statutes are "improper" and therefore unconstitutional. Our difference, quite bluntly, is that I believe that the Sweeping Clause
is a textual vehicle for implementing the principle of departmental independence, while Professor Paulsen views such a principle
as a free-floating abstraction without constitutional grounding.
The ultimate question is therefore: who is right about the sweep
of the Sweeping Clause with respect to congressional statutes affecting the allocation of power among federal institutions? With
all due respect, the case for departmental independence is at
least as strong as the case for departmental coordinacy, which
Professor Paulsen has developed so thoughtfully in his prior
work. The principle of departmental independence is part of the
''proper" allocation of powers under the federal Constitution.
That principle entails an independent judicial power to ascertain,
interpret, and apply the relevant law. Congress cannot tell
courts how to reason any more than it can tell courts how to decide.
III
Professor Paulsen's most compelling point is that a statute
regulating the use of precedent is not very different (if it is different at all) from a host of statutes, many of ancient vintage,
that seem to do precisely what the principle of decisional inde83. Professor Paulsen suggests that there may be a disanalogy between presidential
powers under Article II and judicial powers under Article III if the "executive Power" by
its nature contains an element of discretion that is not present in the "judicial Power."
See id. at 1580 n.119. That is certainly true, but it has a boomerang effect on Professor
Paulsen's argument. If the judiciary does not have discretion to choose decisionmaking
methodologies under Article III, then the choice of a methodology must be a matter of
constitutional command rather than of nonconstitutional policy, which undermines Professor Paulsen's case for congressional power. In fact, however, there are inescapable
elements of discretion under both Article II and Article III. There may be differences in
the degree of discretion, but I doubt whether Professor Paulsen wants to draw constitutional distinctions based on those differences in degree.
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pendence flatly forbids. The point is entirely correct in its factual claims about modern practice, and it has bite from two directions. First, if Congress has been regulating the judicial decision-making process since the start of the United States
government, doesn't that tell us something important about the
original understanding of the Sweeping Clause?

Second, just

how far does the principal of decisional independence cut? Does
it mean that all of the numerous federal statutes invoked by Professor Paulsen, from the Anti-Injunction Act to section 706 of

the Administrative Procedure Act, are unconstitutional? If the
answer is yes, then the consequences of applying a principle of
decisional independence would be quite extraordinary.
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE

The first question is the easiest to address. The numerous
examples of congressional statutes offered by Professor Paulsen
say little, if anything, about the original public understanding of
the Sweeping Clause, even if we are to take early legislative en-

actments as good evidence of original public meaning.
A great many congressional statutes currently regulate the
standards of proof that courts must employ when deciding certain issues. The bulk of these statutes, such as Rule 52(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 sections 706(2)(A) and
706(2)(E) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 86 and the numerous organic statutes that prescribe a scope of review for appeals from federal agency action," purport to mandate a defer-

ential standard of review to lower courts or administrative
agencies, though Congress occasionally mandates a nondeferen-

84. Just how much such enactments should count in determining original public
meaning is a question that can be answered only in the context of a detailed specification
of the mechanics of a jurisprudence of original public meaning. For now, it is enough to
note that they are surely admissible evidence, even if they ultimately prove to be of little
significance.
85. FRCP 52(a) (stating that findings of fact of federal district courts "shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous").
86. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) & (E) (1994) ("[Tihe reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency actions, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law... [or] (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or
otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute").
87. See, for example, 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (1994) (directing courts to set aside conclusions of the Merit Systems Protection Board if they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law... or... unsupported by substantial
evidence").
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tial standard.88 These statutes are direct, profound regulations of
the judicial decision-making process and thus directly challenge
the principle of decisional independence. As far as original
meaning is concerned, however, they are essentially irrelevant.
All of these statutes are of distinctively modern origin and therefore, as indicia of original meaning, come "shrouded in an aura
of incorrectness." 89 Enactments of early Congresses carry some
weight concerning original meaning because the members of
those bodies were part of the original public.9 ° As one gets farther from the moment of framing, however, the reliability of
subsequent generations of lawmakers goes down, and possibly
quite dramatically. Certainly by the twentieth century, one
would hardly view enactments of Congress as plausible indications of original constitutional meaning. And the statutes prescribing standards of proof are essentially twentieth-century
phenomena.9 '
By contrast, the Rules of Decision Act, which declares that
"[t]he laws of the several states, except where the Constitution
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply,, 92 originated as section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789."
The statute seems squarely to regulate the admissibility of legal
materials and thus directly to control the decision-making process. In fact, however, the Rules of Decision Act is not a regulation of the judicial decision-making process because it does not
create any new legal rule for courts to follow. The primary obligation of courts is to decide cases in accordance with governing

88. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1994) (prescribing de novo review for agency determinations under the Freedom of Information Act).
89. I owe this delicious phrase to Charles J. Cooper, in a conversation sometime in
1985. Mr. Cooper was referring specifically to decisions of the Warren Court, but his
assessment is easily generalizable to the twentieth-century constitutional world.
90. The weight or significance of their views, of course, are blunted by their institutional position in Congress. Members of Congress are not disinterested spectators on
constitutional issues; their own powers, and those of their constitutional competitors, are
on the line. Accordingly, enactments of early Congresses may be less reliable, rather
than more reliable, indicators of original meaning than some other sources.
91. The APA, for example, was enacted in 1946, which was not a time distinguished
by its fidelity to original meaning. The organic statutes that preceded the APA did not
date from much earlier. For a comprehensive discussion of the development of the doctrine of deference to administrative agencies, see generally Gordon G. Young, Public
Rights and the FederalJudicialPower: From Murray's Lessee Through Crowell to Schor,
35 Buffalo L. Rev. 765 (1986).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994).
93. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
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law. That necessarily requires a determination of which law
governs. "The laws of the several states ... in cases where they

apply" are clearly part of that governing law; if they apply, and if
they are not preempted by a hierarchically superior source of
law such as the Constitution or a federal statute or treaty, courts
have an obligation to apply them. This obligation does not stem
from, or even gain any force from, the Rules of Decision Act; it
stems directly from the obligation to employ "[t]he judicial
Power" of deciding cases in accordance with governing law. The
Rules of Decision Act is an exhortation rather than a regulation,
along the lines of "decide cases correctly" or "observe National
Vinegar Month." It does not change the legal landscapebeyond, perhaps, expressing a congressional sentiment against
implied preemption of state law-and thus does not implicate
the principle of decisional independence. This declaratory role
was understood in the founding era, 9 4 and the Rules of Decision
Act therefore does not reflect any underlying theory of the
Sweeping Clause.
Congress routinely legislates concerning the remedies that
federal courts can employ. The most obvious example is the
Anti-Injunction Act,95 which dates back to 1793.96 Professor
Paulsen relies on this early example of congressional regulation
as support for his broad reading of the Sweeping Clause.97
When all is said and done, it may well be that the power to
award a remedy is so bound up with the power to decide a case
that Congress has no more power to regulate remedies than to
regulate the decision-making process.9" The differences between
determining liability and determining remedies, however, are
large enough so that evidence of practice with respect to remedies counts for little, if anything, concerning original understandings of congressional power to regulate more direct aspects of
the case-deciding process, such as the use of precedent.

94. This understanding of the Rules of Decision Act-and the early materials that
support it-was set forth by Justice Scalia in an important but generally overlooked opinion in 1987. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143,
162 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). But I actually owe these insights about the Rules of
Decision Act to Lee Liberman Otis, to whom I am grateful.
95. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994) ("A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.").
96. Act of Mar. 2, 1793, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 334-35.
97. See Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1585 (cited in note 12).
98. See notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, statutes abrogating prudential standing doctrines,
which Professor Paulsen regards as "perhaps the most direct
analogy to a statute abrogating stare decisis," 99 tell us nothing
about original understanding. Not only are the statutes concerning prudential standing a twentieth-century invention, but the
prudential standing doctrine itself is a twentieth-century invention of highly dubious character. 0 0 Moreover, standing goes to
the power of a court to hear the case, not to the manner in which
a case within the court's jurisdiction should be decided.
That leaves the Full Faith and Credit Act,' 1 which dates
back to 1790.102 This statute certainly regulates the judicial decision-making process by prescribing a choice-of-law rule and,
more importantly, by specifying the manner in which the applicable law must be proved.'0° The Full Faith and Credit Clause
expressly authorizes Congress to pass such laws for state
courts,0 4 but if Congress has the same power with respect to
federal courts, it must come from the Sweeping Clause. Accordingly, the Full Faith and Credit Act does stand as a founding-era
example of congressional regulation of judicial decision-making.

99. Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1585 (cited in note 12).
100. If courts properly have jurisdiction over a case, it is hard to see where they get
the power to refuse to decide it. Some variant of prudential standing can perhaps be defended as an exercise of remedial equitable discretion, cf. Steven G. Calabresi and Gary
Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on the Harris Execution, 102 Yale L.J. 255,
257-65 (1992) (discussing remedial equitable discretion in the context of abstention doctrines), but such a doctrine would have to be calibrated to the circumstances of particular
cases and would not implicate the jurisdiction of the courts.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994) ("The records and judicial proceedings of any court of
any... State, Territory or Possession... shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.").
102. Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 122.
103. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 ("The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any
such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in
other courts within the United States and its Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certification of a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form."). This feature of
the statute is more significant than the statute's direct choice of law rule because the obligation to apply state law probably exists independently of statute, for the same reasons
that the Rules of Decision Act is merely declaratory. See notes 83-85 and accompanying
text. Moreover, John Harrison has suggested to me that choice of law rules are distinguishable from rules governing other aspects of judicial decisionmaking because they are
rules of law rather than rules about rules of law. If precedent is a sound (epistemological) guide to such matters, Professor Harrison is almost certain to be right about this.
104. The clause provides that "the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof." U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1. Linguistically, one could read this language as an express authorization to legislate for federal courts as well as state courts, but the context of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause makes such a reading dubious.
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But that hardly constitutes such an overwhelming indication of
the original understanding that it undermines the principle of
decisional independence. It is more likely that the founders got
one wrong than that the Constitution does not contain a principle of decisional independence.
One can therefore glean little, if anything, about the original
meaning of the Sweeping Clause from early congressional practice concerning regulation of judicial decision-making. That
practice was too sparse and episodic to warrant any strong conclusions.
B. THE LEGALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE
So how much damage does the principle of decisional independence do to the United States Code? The question turns out
to be very complicated-too complicated to answer in full in a
single article. I can only sketch out some general considerations
that must guide the inquiry.
Consider what appears to be the simplest case: congressional statutes that regulate the standard of proof that courts
must employ. Numerous statutes providing for judicial review of
federal agency action specify that certain kinds of agency decisions must be given some measure of deference by reviewing
courts. Factual findings of administrative agencies are almost
always subject to statutorily-mandated deferential review, and
policy decisions may be reversed only if they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."' 05 The specification of a standard of proof is an essential part of the judicial decision-making process, so these statutes
represent a direct challenge to the principle of decisional independence. Indeed, they are hard to distinguish from a statute
that flatly requires decision in favor of a specific party. There is
not much distance between "decide the case in favor of X" and
"decide the case in favor of X unless you determine that X's position approaches lunacy." Are all such statutes unconstitutional?
The straightforward answer is yes, but the path to that answer is far from clear. The principle of decisional independence
would seem quite obviously to deny Congress the power to dic-

105. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). For a brief description of what this standard
means in practice, see generally Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedureand Process:Agency
Duties of Explanation for Legal Conclusions, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 313 (1996).
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tate something as fundamental to the case-deciding process as
the standard of proof, but there are two considerations that require pause. First, at least in cases in which the government is
the defendant, one must deal with the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Under conventional doctrine, the federal government
and its instrumentalities are immune from suit unless Congress
expressly overrides the government's sovereign immunity and
permits suit. 10 6 Moreover, conventional doctrine says that Congress can condition its waivers of sovereign immunity to alter the
usual rules of judicial proceedings, including denial of a right to
an Article III adjudicator. 0 7 If this implication from the doctrine of sovereign immunity is correct, then perhaps Congress
can regulate the standard of proof, or other aspects of the judicial decision-making process, in cases that reach the courts only
because of a waiver of sovereign immunity.
There are two reasons, however, why this argument might
not salvage statutes that regulate the standard of proof for reviewing agency decisions. First, the argument depends on the
validity of the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity. If suits
against the government do not actually require congressional
permission, then Congress obviously cannot claim any power to
condition the suits on the alteration of baseline rules concerning
judicial review. Academic commentators are virtually unanimous in their condemnation of sovereign immunity, °8 but the
true answer may be more complex than a simple up-or-down assessment. Even if governmental accountability is a constitutional requirement,' ® the form of that accountability may be
variable; the legitimacy of sovereign immunity may depend on
the status of other doctrines, such as official immunity, the political question doctrine, and other bodies of law that regulate
106. For a brief overview of the development of the doctrine of federal sovereign
immunity and the "strict construction" rule that applies to statutory waivers, see Gregory
C. Sisk, Litigation with the FederalGovernment 104-35, 143-59 (Foundation Press, 2000).
107. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272 (1855).
108. See Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 739, 763-754 n.126 (1999).
109. For an interesting argument to this effect, see James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial
Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 889 (1997). Guy Seidman and I have
elsewhere criticized Professor Pfander's claim that the First Amendment right to petition
bears on the constitutionality of sovereign immunity. See Lawson and Seidman, 93 Nw.
U. L. Rev. at 763-66 (cited in note 108); but see James E. Pfander, Restoring the Right to
Petition, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 219 (1999) (defending his thesis). Professor Pfander, however, can be completely wrong about the relevance of the right to petition while being
completely right about a constitutional baseline rule of governmental accountability.
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one's ability to challenge governmental action." Guy Seidman
and I plan to explore these issues in a subsequent article. Until
that analysis is fully developed, I do not want to opine on the legitimacy of federal sovereign immunity as an original matter.
Second, even if one accepts that suits against government
agencies require congressional permission, the standard move
from a power to permit suit to a power to permit suit only on
certain conditions is wrong. The move rests on the proposition
that the greater power to control jurisdiction includes the lesser
power to control the manner in which that jurisdiction is exercised. But the power to control the decision-making process is
not a lesser power than the power to control jurisdiction. It is a
qualitatively different power that is either on the same level or,
more likely, on a different scale than the power over jurisdiction.
Congress controls the "jurisdiction" of the executive department
by choosing which statutes to enact and by allocating funds, but
that does not authorize Congress to specify, for instance, who
should be prosecuted under each substantive statute. The legislative power includes the power to determine (to some extent)
the sphere of activity over which the executive power acts, but
once that sphere is determined, the executive power is selfexecuting. Similarly, Congress has some power (how much it is
unnecessary to say here) to determine the jurisdiction of the
various federal courts, but once that jurisdiction is conferred and
the judicial power's sphere of activity is established, that power
is self-executing."' Accordingly, the power to authorize suit, to
the extent that such power exists in Congress, carries with it no
ancillary power to prescribe the manner in which such suits must
be heard and decided. Any such congressional power must find
authorization in the Sweeping Clause and therefore must be
"necessary and proper" for effectuating the federal judicial
power.'12
110. See Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing
without Authority, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 581, 594 (2000).
111. On the self-executing character of the judicial power, see Engdahl, 1999 B.Y.U.
L. Rev. at 83-90 (cited in note 1).
112. One could reach the same results by applying some variant of the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine, which forbids Congress from doing indirectly what it may not
do directly. The precise contours, origins, and viability of that doctrine is a matter of ongoing controversy. Put less delicately, the subject is an odoriferous swamp. In one
memorable two-year period, the doctrine generated, without any resolution, two major
articles in the HarvardLaw Review, see Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987
Term, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent,
102 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 Harv.
L. Rev. 1413 (1989); and a full symposium in the San Diego Law Review, see Unconstitu-
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In any event, many statutes prescribing standards of proof
do not involve suits against the government. Rule 52(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for instance, obligates federal
appellate courts to defer to findings of fact by district courts
unless those findings are "clearly erroneous."" This standard
purports to govern all civil suits, including suits between private
parties and suits in which the government is the plaintiff. One
therefore cannot escape the need to determine the constitutionality of legislatively-specified standards of proof.
A second consideration that might affect the constitutionality of legislation prescribing a standard of proof is the distinction
between questions of fact and questions of law. Although Congress has occasionally legislated a standard of proof for propositions of law, 1 4 most legislative standards of proof concern review
of factual findings. Professor Paulsen (whose proposed statute
regulates the law-finding rather than fact-finding process) discounts the significance of any proposed distinction between law
and fact on the ground that "[d]eciding questions of fact and deciding questions of law are both part of the core judicial function
of deciding cases and controversies."" Professor Paulsen may
well be right, but the answer is not as clear as he suggests.
I have spent much of my professional life arguing that, for
purposes of determining principles of proof, there is no theoretically valid distinction between law and fact. 1 6 The founding
generation, alas, did not have the benefit of my wisdom. It
adopted a Constitution that expressly recognizes a distinction between questions of law and fact. The so-called Exceptions
Clause of Article III provides that the Supreme Court "shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make." ' 1 7 The clause clearly assumes that there is a distinction,
tional Conditions Symposium, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 175-345 (1989). When one looks for
constitutional grounding for the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, however, one is led
inexorably to the Sweeping Clause. Accordingly, direct analysis under the Sweeping
Clause is much cleaner.
113. FRCP 52(a).
114. See Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1588-89 (cited in note 12).
115. Id. at1588.
116. See Lawson, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 862-866 (cited in note 79); Gary Lawson,
Proving Ownership, 11 Soc. Phil. & Policy 139 (1994); Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: ItsCause and Cure, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 411 (1996).
117.

U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, cl.2 (emphasis added).

It is "so-called" because it

does not in fact authorize Congress to make exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction but merely cross-references the power granted by the Sweeping Clause. See Engdahl, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev, at 119-32 (cited in note 1).
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at least in some contexts, between questions of law and fact.
Furthermore, the Seventh Amendment limits judicial review of
jury decisions with respect to any "fact tried by a jury.""' 8 And
this is apart from the background assumptions of the surrounding legal order, which obviously sought to distinguish law from
fact for many important legal purposes, as our legal system continues to do today. One must therefore take very seriously the
idea that the Constitution places greater limits on congressional
power to regulate the judicial decision-making process with respect to law-finding than with respect to fact-finding.
In the end, I would conclude that Professor Paulsen is right
that law-finding and fact-finding are equally fundamental to the
judicial process, but with a sense of unease that might prompt
reconsideration. Given, then, that (1) the law-fact distinction
probably does not affect congressional power to regulate judicial
decision-making under the Sweeping Clause, (2) sovereign immunity, even if valid as a doctrine, does not permit Congress to
exercise control over suits that it permits, and (3) many standard-of-proof statutes purport to regulate suits that do not implicate federal sovereign immunity, the bottom line must be that
federal statutes that prescribe a standard of proof for federal
courts are per se unconstitutional. That conclusion encompasses, inter alia, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), section
706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, and all of the organic
statutes that prescribe standards of review for appeals from
agency decisions. This does not mean that courts may never give
deference to the views of other actors, such as administrative
agencies or lower courts. The permissibility of judge-made deference doctrines is another question altogether that turns on the
distinction between legal and epistemological deference." 9 But
Congress may not prescribe for the federal courts the amount of
evidence that is required to prove legal propositions.
If Congress cannot prescribe the standard of proof for legal
propositions, does that mean that Congress cannot prescribe as
well the admissibility or the weight of various pieces of evidence?
The question is critical for two reasons.
First, Professor
Paulsen's proposed precedent-limiting statute is really a rule of
evidence for propositions of law: in deciding certain classes of
cases, the courts may not give decisive weight to prior decisions.
Thus, the power of Congress to prescribe rules of admissibility
118.
119.

U.S. Const., Amend. VII (emphasis added).
Seenote58.
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or significance is the specific issue that Professor Paulsen has put
before us. Second, if Congress cannot regulate the admissibility
or weight of evidence, the consequences are very large-perhaps
even larger than the consequences of invalidating congressional
specification of a standard of proof. The Federal Rules of Evidence would be the most obvious casualty, and the Full Faith
and Credit Act (at least those parts of it that prescribe the manner in which state laws and decisions must be proved) would not
be far behind. Subject only to some lingering doubts about the
constitutional significance of a law-fact distinction in this context, the unavoidable conclusion is that these statutes are unconstitutional. The process of reasoning to a decision involves formulating and applying rules of admissibility, rules of significance,
and standards of proof. If Congress can regulate any stage of
this process, it can effectively shape the process of decisionmaking. The principle of decisional independence forbids this.
Nor can Congress mandate that courts apply specific presumptions; a presumption is a direct regulation of the significance of
certain pieces of evidence. And that is true whether or not the
presumption is "irrebuttable."
Rules of procedure, however, are another matter. There is
no question that procedure can affect substance, so that seemingly "procedural" rules can have an impact on substantive decision-making. The fact is familiar from many contexts. 120 Nonetheless, the distinction between substance and procedure is
deeply engrained in our legal system. Procedural rules concerning such matters as forms of pleading, methods for executing
judgments, empanelling of juries, etc. are surely precisely the
kinds of laws "for carrying into Execution" the judicial power
that the Sweeping Clause is designed to authorize. It is possible,
of course, for some of these procedural rules to affect the process of decision-making in fairly direct ways; the order in which
proof must be presented, for example, surely has the potential to
affect decisions. How can we tell whether a congressional regulation of judicial procedure trenches so deeply into the decisionmaking process that it violates the principle of judicial independence?

120. As a mundane example: the Administrative Procedure Act exempts "rules of
agency ... procedure" from notice-and-comment requirements. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A)
(1994). When do rules of procedure, such as rules regulating the order in which evidence
should be presented, shade into regulations of substance? The courts have no good answer, and neither do I. See Gary Lawson, FederalAdministrative Law 281-84 (West
Group, 2d ed. 2001).
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Professors Engdahl and Redish have conveniently provided
the solution. Professor Engdahl points out that any congressional regulations of judicial procedure must, by an objective
1 21
standard, be "for carrying into Execution" the judicial power.
If the rule hinders rather than helps the execution of the judicial
power, it is unconstitutional. Professor Redish adds that such
procedural rules would be unconstitutional if they "so interfere
with the courts' performance of the judicial function... as to invade the courts' 'judicial power' under Article III. ''022 Although
that proposition may sound absurdly circular ("a congressional
rule unconstitutionally intrudes on the judicial power if it so intrudes on the judicial power as to be unconstitutional"), it is as
sound a formulation of what is a "proper" procedural statute as
we will find. This kind of circularity is common, and unavoidable, in many separation-of-powers contexts. For instance, the
correct test for whether a statute vesting policymaking discretion
in the executive is an improper, and therefore unconstitutional,
delegation of legislative power is: "Congress must make whatever policy decisions are sufficiently important to the statutory
scheme at issue so that Congress must make them."' 123 An "Officer[] of the United States" under the Appointments Clause is,
essentially, any employee who is important enough to be called
an "Officer[] of the United States."' '4 A principal officer under
the Appointments Clause is, essentially, an officer who is important enough to be considered principal. 25 There are matters for
which the Constitution simply does not provide a bright line
rule, so that one cannot avoid the exercise of judgment based on
shades and degrees. The point at which procedural rules slip
into substantive regulations of judicial decision-making is one of
them. Accordingly, procedural rules must be assessed on a case-

121. See Engdahl, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 172-74 (cited in note 1).
122. Redish, 46 Mercer L. Rev. at 725 (cited in note 5).
123. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
1231, 1239 (1994).
124. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (defining an officer-correctly, in
my view-as "any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States").
125. This was Justice Souter's view in Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 666-669
(1997) (Souter, J., concurring), in contrast to the majority's evident position that
"[g]enerally speaking, the term 'inferior officer' connotes a relationship with some higher
ranking officer or officers below the President: Whether one is an 'inferior' officer depends on whether he has a superior." Id. at 662. Although it feels strange to side with
Justice Souter over Justice Scalia, the former has the better of the arguments on this
point.
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by-case basis to determine whether they unduly regulate the decision-making process. 116
That leaves congressional regulation of judicial remedies.
The fashioning of a remedy is an essential aspect of deciding a
case.127 A law expanding the range of potential remedies available to a court is hard to challenge, but a law restrictinga court's
power to apply its traditional range of remedies is a fairly blatant
interference with the decision-making process. Such laws either
fail to "carry[] into Execution" the judicial power, are not
"proper," or both. Professor Engdahl's brief but thoughtful
analysis on this point seems largely right.128 That means, inter
alia, that the Anti-Injunction Act is unconstitutional, as are the
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995129 that do
not simply declare existing law.'30
Professor Paulsen is entirely right that these conclusions
represent an "extraordinary challenge to congressional power
and ...an extraordinary departure from settled law.. ..""' His
proposal to regulate by statute the courts' use of precedent is
tame by comparison. But it is still wrong.
126. For a thoughtful study of the line between substance and procedure, with a focus on the constitutionality of legislative presumptions, see generally D. Michael Risinger, "Substance" and "Procedure"Revisited With Some Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of "IrrebuttablePresumptions",30 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 189 (1982). All of
this stands apart from the debate whether prescribing rules of judicial procedure is a judicial function, a legislative function, or both. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent
Power of FederalCourts and the StructuralConstitution, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735 (2001).
127. See Engdahl, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 170-71 (cited in note 1).
128. Id. at 170-72. He is wrong in his defense of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of FederalBureau of Narcotics,403 U.S. 388 (1971), to the extent that his discussion goes beyond Bivens' claims about remedies to include the proposition that the Constitution provides a direct substantive source of liability. But that is another article.
129. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (1996) codified at 18 U.S.C. §
3626 (1994 Supp. IV).
130. The key provision of this statute provides that prison injunctions must be lifted
"if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the
relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right." 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). To the extent that this formulation departs from
traditional rules for lifting injunctions, it is invalid. The precise question in Millerwhether Congress can provide for an automatic stay of injunctions-piggybacks on this
issue. 530 U.S. at 331 (cited in note 4) see also 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2) The most interesting provision of this statute, however, is the provision forbidding courts from terminating
injunctions if they make "written findings" that the substantive terms of § 3626(b)(2) are
satisfied. Can Congress attach special significance to the "writtenness" of judicial findings (or require courts to announce their decisions in Latin or to spray shaving cream on
litigants who raise frivolous evidentiary objections)? The answer depends on whether
such statutes merely prescribe rules of procedure. See notes 120-126 and accompanying
text.
131. Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1590 (cited in note 12).
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Professor Paulsen raises the specter of an "uncontrollable
judiciary"'1 2 and "an uncheckable judicial power to prescribe
rules at variance with the Constitution,"'133 which suggests that
the alternative to his statute is a regime in which courts are free
to choose any method of decision-making, and any theory of
precedent, without external control. This is not true. Even
without Professor Paulsen's statute, the Constitution prescribes
two methods for controlling judicial use of precedent or any
other decision-making methodology. Professor Paulsen even alludes to these methods, both of which are near and dear to his
(and my) heart.
First, Congress does indeed have the power to control judicial uses of precedent, but only through the constitutionally prescribed method of impeachment. The reach of the impeachment
power is beyond the scope of this article, 3 4 but that power does
allow Congress to impeach and remove a judge based on that
judge's decision-making process. Consider, for example, a judge
who decides cases based on the race of the parties, or the number of letters in the parties' names, or the positions of planetary
bodies. Professor Paulsen would have no trouble with the
proposition that such judges could be impeached and removed
from office,' and he would be right.
The Constitution provides for impeachment for "Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.' 36 The
phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" is a term of art that is
not coextensive with the universe of indictable crimes. 1 7 It refers generally to abuse of office or neglect of duty,3 8 and judges
who egregiously fail to decide cases in accordance with law are
both abusing their offices and neglecting their duty. 13 9 If Con132.

Id.at 1581.

133.

Id.

134. Chris Moore and I have elsewhere discussed the impeachment power at some
length in the context of presidential refusals to enforce unconstitutional statutes. See
Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1307-12 (cited in note 26). Much of that discussion, as we then recognized, see id. at 1311-12, is applicable to judicial impeachments and
removals as well.
135. See Paulsen, 109 Yale L.J. at 1600-01 (cited in note 12).
136. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 4.
137. See Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1307 n.191 (cited in note 26) (noting
the scholarly consensus on this point).
138. See id. at 1308-09.
139. How "egregiously" must the judges flaunt the law in order to trigger the possibility of impeachment? That is a topic for another article, which I have no plans or desire
to write. It is enough for now to establish that decisionmaking methodologies are fair
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gress views a particular methodology as akin to reliance on astrology, impeachment and removal of a judge for consistent application of that methodology seems to be well within Congress'
constitutional power.
This conclusion is not beyond question. Professor Redish
has forcefully defended a much more limited role for the impeachment power, based largely on the principle of decisional
independence. 140 He (rightly) worries that an extensive impeachment power could blunt the force of an independent judiciary. 41 I cannot join issue with him here, 142 but suffice it to say
that Professor Redish explicitly rejects an originalist approach to
determining the range of the impeachment power. 4 - It is one
thing to use the principle of decisional independence to give content to a "proper" distribution of governmental powers. It is another thing altogether to use the principle to undercut a wellunderstood (in 1789) understanding of the phrase "high Crimes
and Misdemeanors." Because the ultimate originalist inquiry is
hypothetical rather than historical, however, it is not impossible
that even an established understanding could be wrongbecause, for example, it failed to grasp certain essential features
of the overall constitutional structure. Accordingly, Professor
Redish's position cannot be casually dismissed by originalists.
But if one is going to bring constitutional principles to bear on
this inquiry (and one should), the principle of coordinacy, which
is as fundamental as the principle of decisional independence,
cuts in favor of the rather clear original understanding of the impeachment power. If it is unlikely that the Constitution, with its
careful scheme of divided power, permits Congress to control
the process of judicial decision-making by statute, it is just as
unlikely that the Constitution provides no mechanism at all for
controlling rogue judicial decision-making.
If courts are indeed abusing the doctrine of precedent, then
Congress can control that abuse through the impeachment process-with all of the cumbersome mechanisms that that process
entails. But Congress can no more circumvent its responsibilities
game in principle for the impeachment power and that a consistent pattern of application
of faulty methodologies is an impeachable offense, even if a single, random faulty decision would not be.
140. See Redish, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 675, 682-86 (cited in note 20).
141. See id. at 685-86.
142. Chris Moore's and my prior discussion of this topic, see Lawson and Moore, 81
Iowa L. Rev. at 1307-12 (cited in note 26), was in large measure a response to some of
Professor Redish's earlier-expressed views.
143. See Redish, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 680-82 (cited in note 20).
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to police the judicial department under the Impeachment
Clauses by passing ordinary legislation than it can circumvent its
responsibilities to police the executive department under the impeachment power by passing ordinary legislation, such as laws
providing for independent counsels.
Second, the President has the power to control judicial
abuses of precedent through the power to refuse to enforce
judgments. Professor Paulsen has elsewhere defended a presidential power to refuse to enforce judgments that the President
believes are unconstitutional.14 Chris Moore and I have elsewhere defended a somewhat lesser presidential power to refuse
to enforce judgments when the President believes with a very
high degree of confidence that they are unconstitutional. 145 In either case, the President has some degree of power to ensure that
the judicial decision-making process stays within proper bounds.
Neither of these methods of control, of course, is as sweeping or as easy to implement as Professor Paulsen's statute. But
that is the Framers' fault-or, perhaps, their wisdom.

144.
145.

See Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L.J. at 228-292 (cited in note 56).
See Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1324-29 (cited in note 26).

